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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is a result of a Conference, appropriately titled
Two Shocks to the Bankruptcy System.' The Conference title
recognizes that the revisions made to Article 9,' and the proposed
Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S. 1981, Cornell
University; J.D. 1987, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to Edward
J. Janger, David Nowlin, Thomas M. Ward, and Jennifer Wriggins for reading
and commenting on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. This paper is a result of the remarks made by the author at the
Symposium entitled Two Shocks to the Bankruptcy System: Revised UCC
Article 9 and the Pending Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, Where Do We Go
From Here? held at Fordham University School of Law on November 15, 2001.
2. U.C.C. §§ 9-101- 9-709 (revised 1999). Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") deals with debt collateral and secured transactions.
See Lawrence R. Ahem, III, "Workouts" Under Revised Article 9: A Review of
Changes and Proposal for Study, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 115, 116 (2001)
("Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs the creation, perfection,
priority and enforcement of consensual security interests in personal property
and fixtures, as well as most consignments of personal property and sales of
certain types of intangible personal property."). Article 9 was revised in 1999
("Revised Article 9" or "Article 9"), and has been adopted uniformly by all U.S.
states. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
States Uniformly Enact Article 9 Revisions, July 2001, at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/prl-07-01.asp (last visited Mar. 13,
2002). See generally Ingrid Michelson Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, 2001: A
Code Odyssey (New Dawn for the Article 9 Creditor), 106 CoM. L.J. 105 (2001)
(discussing the key changes; "[m]any trees have died and many CLE credits have
already been earned in the name of understanding Revised Article 9"). Article
9's recent revision have major implications for the financial world. See id. at 105-
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changes to the Bankruptcy Code,3 if enacted, will have a significant
impact on firms and their creditors in bankruptcy. The Panel I
participated in further recognized the impact these revisions and
proposed changes will have on securitization originators in
bankruptcy, as well as on their creditors.' Indeed, many of these
statutory changes are specifically designed to enhance the rights of
secured creditors, as well as the rights of securitization transaction
participants, once a debtor files for bankruptcy.'
The central theme that runs through Revised Article 9 is the
facilitation of secured credit. It is now easier for creditors to
encumber a greater number and variety of types of assets. 6
06.
3. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.).
4. Securitization, also known as structured financing, is the method of
finance whereby a debtor transfers certain assets with a cash flow to a special
purpose corporation ("SPC"); the SPC in turn transforms the cash flows into
securities. See generally Glenn B. McClelland, Jr. & James W. McDonald, Jr.,
Securitizing Trade and Lease Receivables, in THE ASSET SECURITIZATION
HANDBOOK 123, 130 (Phillip L. Zweig ed., 1989). These securities, known as
asset-backed securities ("ABS"), are then sold to private or public investors. See
id. Securitization remains the fastest growing sector in the capital markets, and
there are currently about $185 billion ABS outstanding. Id. Commonly,
originators securitize their assets to obtain certain advantages over alternative
financing methods. See id. These advantages include improved liquidity,
improved risk management, accounting-related benefits, and the ability to raise
funds at a lower effective interest rate.
5. See G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and
Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 3 (2001) (discussing those changes in
Article 9 that will significantly strengthen the rights of secured creditors in
bankruptcy cases).
6. As noted in the PEB Commentary:
[One could ask] ... whether Article 9 should limit the types of property that
can be subjected to a security interest or the extent to which a debtor's property
can be so encumbered or one might question whether any perfection step
should be necessary to obtain priority over judicial lien creditors or other
competing claimants. Or one might question whether security interests ought
to be enforceable at all.
Although it is well aware of challenges to the validity of some basic principles
[underlying] Article 9, the Committee chose not to undertake a thorough
reexamination of those principles. Nor did the Committee's deliberations
reflect strong support for making major adjustments in the balance that Article
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Correspondingly, the revisions to Article 9 do much to enhance the
certainty with which originators are able to securitize a greater
number of types of assets.7 The ongoing debate in the academic
literature, concerning both the economic efficiency of secured
credit and the normative implications of secured creditors' priority
over unsecured creditors,' has spilled over to a debate about the
efficiency and normative effects of securitization.9
9 now strikes between secured parties and unsecured creditors. But insofar as
the Committee's recommendations would make it easier and less costly to take
and perfect security interests, they are likely to have the effect of improving the
position of secured parties relative to that of unsecured creditors . . . . The
Committee believes that any necessary adjustments for the protection of third
parties should be made directly, as by changing Article 9's priority rules or by
modifying the avoidance powers or other distributional rules of the Bankruptcy
Code, and not indirectly, as by increasing the difficulty and expense of creating
perfected security interests.
PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE U.C.C. ARTICLE
9 at 8-9 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter PEB STUDY]; see also James J. White, Work
and Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 2089 (1994) (declaring that the
efficiency of Article 9 is irrelevant to the revision process); Steven L. Harris &
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee Report. Strong Signals
and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 561, 562 (1993) ("Article 9 represents what
many believe to be a grand victory for secured parties.").
7. See, e.g., Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 2, at 105-06 ("The revisions
significantly expand Article 9's scope . . . ."); Terry M. Anderson et al.,
Attachment and Perfection of Security Interests Under Revised Article 9: A "Nuts
and Bolts" Primer, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 179, 181 (2001) (writing that
"[tihe Revision will expand the scope of Article 9 to include transactions and
types of personal property previously not covered").
8. See, e.g., Symposium: The Priority of Secured Debt, 82 CORNELL L. REv.
1279 (1997); Lucian A. Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994); Alan
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with
Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REv.
1373 (1997).
9. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1064 (1998) (arguing that because debtor retains
some residual interest in assets sold in connection with a securitization, such
assets should properly be returned to debtor's estate upon a bankruptcy filing);
see also Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk
Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REv. 101, 128-29 (1997) (describing the costs and benefits
of securitization); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23-
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Notwithstanding this debate, Revised Article 9 not only
reflects the drafters' affirmative decision to further enhance
secured creditors' rights,"° it also includes myriad provisions
designed to facilitate securitization transactions." Because
bankruptcy law looks to Article 9 to determine the rights of
creditors and transferees with respect to personal property,2 the
changes to Article 9 enhancing the rights and interests of creditors
as well as asset-backed security transferees are, in effect, changes
in bankruptcy law. The question raised by these Article 9 revisions
as well as by the proposed change in the Bankruptcy Code, is
31 (1996) (noting that securitization may be used as a strategy for judgment
proofing); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51
STAN. L. REv. 147, 149 (1998) (exploring the difficulties involved in judgment-
proofing large businesses); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment
Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55 (1999) (defending
the efficacy of judgment proofing); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The
Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1998) (discussing the
impact of securitization on a securitizing debtor's unsecured creditors); Lois R.
Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory
Institutionalization of Securitization, 33 CONN. L. REV. 199 (2000) (describing
the effect of Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy Code revisions on the
securitization and credit markets); Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9,
Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 287 (2001) (discussing the impact of commercial law reforms on securitizing
originators and their creditors in bankruptcy); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent
Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1999) (arguing that
widespread use of securitization as a judgment proofing technique is unlikely);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52 STAN. L. REv. 77 (1999)
(writing that asset securitization is unlikely to cause the "death of liability");
Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 301 (2002).
10. For the drafters' intent, see Ahern, supra note 2, at 116, 118-21 (noting
that the "fundamental ways [in which] the drafters have recalibrated the parties'
rights" promise to "increase secured creditors' leverage substantially, both before
and after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy"). Professor Barry Zaretsky
referred to the Article 9 revision as a "love feast for secured creditors." JULIAN
B. MCDONNELL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANALYSIS OF REVISED ARTICLE
92 (1999).
11. See generally Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and
the Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9.
12. Article 9 "primarily sets out rules defining rights of a secured party
against persons dealing with the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-102 (2001).
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whether these changes are consistent with our historical
understanding of bankruptcy policy.
There are (at least) two views of bankruptcy. One view sees
asset value maximization and asset distribution as the twin goals of
the bankruptcy process." This vision of bankruptcy recognizes the
value of bankruptcy outcomes tracking non-bankruptcy outcomes,
and concedes that a property right redistribution in bankruptcy
should be had only when a divergence from non-bankruptcy rules
would result in an enhancement of estate value.4 An alternative
vision of bankruptcy attaches importance to not only economic
efficiency, but normative concerns such as distributional fairness
among creditors and other stakeholders." Under this view,
bankruptcy should have the effect of altering non-bankruptcy
rights when such alterations further these normative goals. 6
Moreover, the reorganization of viable businesses ought to be
encouraged by the bankruptcy process, for the benefit of the
debtor as well as the full array of stakeholders with an interest in
the debtor's continued viability.'7
Revised Article 9 is not consistent with bankruptcy policy
under either view. The Bankruptcy Code, with its deference to
non-bankruptcy-created property rights," was drafted at a time
13. See generally, Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 9 (detailing the
equitable powers of courts under the Bankruptcy Code).
14. Id. at 656.
15. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
775 (1987).
16. Id. at 785-94. The author lists five main rationales that bankruptcy law
takes into account when deciding how to distribute the loss, most of which reflect
fairness (rather than efficiency) values; e.g., the first rationale is "[r]elative ability
to bear the costs of default." Id. at 790-94.
17. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Symposium: Harmonizing the Business
Bankruptcy Systems of Developed and Developing Nations: Some Issues, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 473, 475-76 (1997) (though "[k]eeping corpses
breathing on expensive life support technology will adversely affect credit
markets... [the] long term view .. . [should] allow[] a reasonable, controlled
chance for reorganization of [viable businesses]").
18. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets
the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and Impact, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 85, 87
(2001) (referring to "the Bankruptcy Code's overarching respect for
nonbankruptcy law's allocation of rights with respect to particular assets in which
2002]
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when old Article 9 was the law governing security interests.19
While many have taken issue with the distributive scheme in
bankruptcy under old Article 9,2° it was that system that was
considered by Congress in its drafting of the substance and
contours of bankruptcy law.2 Revised Article 9, however, is a
significant departure from old Article 9.22 Bankruptcy outcomes
are altered to the extent that non-bankruptcy-law-created property
rights are changed,' thereby upsetting the expectations in place at
the time the Bankruptcy Code was drafted. Moreover, the change
proposed to the definition of "estate" in the Bankruptcy Code,2' if
enacted, will in many cases result in a substantial divergence in
creditors' rights and the value of their interests, depending upon
whether the creditor's debtor is or is not in bankruptcy.
Concerns regarding distributional fairness in bankruptcy are
sharpened when what is being examined is the impact of a
securitization transaction on a debtor-in-bankruptcy's unsecured
creditors. Unlike in a secured lending context, when interests in
the bankruptcy debtor has an interest .... Indeed, nonbankruptcy law's
allocation of property interests lies at the core of the Bankruptcy Code's
provisions for allocating value between the debtor and its creditors").
19. Id. at 91-92.
20. For support of this point of view, as well as a summary of the entire
debate, see Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987).
21. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 15, at 788 (noting that:
Congressional comments on the Bankruptcy Code are liberally sprinkled with
discussions of policies to 'protect the investing public, protect jobs, and help
save troubled businesses,' of concern about the community impact of
bankruptcy, and of 'the public interest' beyond the interests of the disputing
parties. These comments serve as reminders that Congress intended
bankruptcy law to address concerns broader than the immediate problems of
debtors and their identified creditors.);
see also Kathryn R. Heidt, Interest Under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code:
The Right, the Rate and the Relationship to Bankruptcy Policy, 1991 UTAH L.
REv. 361, 385-86 (1991) (citing with approval Professor Warren's view that, in
light of the legislative history, "bankruptcy law is a general distributive
scheme ... [with] the underlying purpose [that] is more complex than the simple
notion of streamlining the enforcement of state-created rights. Rather,
bankruptcy law redistributes losses resulting from a business failure").
22. E.g., Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 9, at 235.
23. See Warner, supra note 5, at 4-5.
24. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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collateral are still included in a debtor's bankruptcy estate, the goal
of the securitization transaction parties is to remove the securitized
assets from the bankruptcy estate.2 Following a securitization and
upon a subsequent liquidation, fewer unencumbered assets may
remain in the debtor's bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the
debtor's residual creditors.
Moreover, a bankruptcy debtor who has securitized its assets
may have a diminished ability to reorganize due to the dearth of
cash collateral. Experience has shown that a firm with a higher
"going concern" value than its liquidation value is worth preserving
for the benefit of the debtor, as well as for all of the debtor's
creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers.' If such a
securitizing debtor finds itself without the cash necessary to sustain
itself while it is formulating a reorganization plan, then a
reorganization may not be tenable - leaving liquidation as the
debtor's only alternative.' This frustrates the long-standing
bankruptcy policy of promoting the reorganization of viable
businesses.
Whether an increase in the proliferation of securitization as a
financing method is a good thing among both large and small firms,
remains unproven. What is clear, however, is that the revisions
made to Article 9 impacting securitization will alter bankruptcy
outcomes, arguably in ways that are inconsistent with bankruptcy
25. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 9, at 1056 ("The form of the transfer.., is
supposed to... [ensure] that no bankruptcy court can ever claim jurisdiction over
the assets again.").
26. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 314.
27. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 101 (1997) (discussing
how viewing the bankruptcy process from the "strongest and most powerful"
creditors' perspective "addresses only a limited number of those affected by a
bankruptcy filing. It fails to take into account the myriad parties touched by a
bankruptcy case and the economic consequences of their situations").
28. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 291.
29. See In re Gathering Rest., Inc., 79 B.R. 992, 999 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986)
("In the context of a bankruptcy case . . . the public interest ... means the
promoting of a successful reorganization which should be one of the paramount
concerns of a bankruptcy court" (quoting In re Otero Mills, Inc., 25 B.R. 1018,
1021 (D.N.M. 1982))).
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policy." Moreover, Section 912 of the bankruptcy reform
legislation provides an inordinate degree of protection and
immunity from the normal operation of the bankruptcy system for
participants in the structured finance market." This favored
treatment appears to come at the expense of other creditors and
debtors who seek to reorganize under the shelter of the bankruptcy
laws.32
II. CONCERNS OF SECURITIZATION ORIGINATORS AND OTHER
PARTIES TO ABS TRANSACTIONS THAT LED TO CHANGES TO
ARTICLE 9 AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
When old Article 933 was first enacted, the securitization
market as currently constituted did not exist.34 Many assets
30. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 5, at 5-6 (concluding that neither of the new
revisions, while dramatically changing the landscape of debtor-creditor law,
accords with any one of the two policy views of bankruptcy); see also id. at 84.
31. See, e.g., Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, 321 n.189 (citing a comment by Professor
Kenneth Klee to Professor Thomas Ward that Section 912 is supported and
lobbied for by certain bond rating agencies and law firms that provide "true sale
opinions"); see also David E. Rovella, Enron's Troubles May Spur Reform, Stall
Deregulation, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 2002, at 1 (mentioning a letter, signed by thirty-
five bankruptcy and commercial law professors and addressed to the chairmen of
the Senate and House judiciary committees, arguing that if enacted, Section 912
will make it easier for companies like Enron to use asset-backed securitization to
shield assets from creditors in bankruptcy).
32. See generally Warner, supra note 5; see also Rovella, supra note 31, at 1
(noting the Enron fiasco).
33. Pre-revision Article 9 shall be referred to in this Article as old Article 9.
34. Securitization's roots are found in the ancient financing method known as
factoring. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED
FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION,
6.2 (1991 & 1994 Supp.). Factoring came into its own in the 14th century English
textile industry, and involved the discounted sale of accounts to a third party. Id.
at 6.2, 6.3. Commonly, the factor both purchases the accounts, and analyzes the
account debtor's credit. See SUSAN CRICHTON & CHARLES FERRIER,
UNDERSTANDING FACTORING AND TRADE CREDIT 7-9, 22-26 (1986). While old
Article 9 did include within its scope the governance of the common commercial
practice of account-based financing, including factoring, the variety of assets
currently securitized, coupled with the complexity of the transactions, it left many
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commonly securitized today were not included within old Article
9's definition of "account., 35  Moreover, it was not always clear
how to classify securitized assets under old Article 9.36 Arguably
many such assets, i.e., licensing receivables and credit card
receivables, could be properly classified as either "accounts,"
"general intangibles" or, in some cases, "instruments."37  This
uncertainty posed a problem for securitizers and their transferees
because only sales of accounts and chattel paper" fell within old
Article 9's reach.39  As such, the securitization of general
intangibles and instruments relegated these transferees to non-
Article 9 law (state common law or remnants of pre-UCC accounts
receivable statutes) to determine their rights and responsibilities.
Moreover, predicting the judicial characterization of the asset
securitizations beyond the reach of old Article 9.
35. Old Article 9 defined accounts as "any right to payment for goods sold or
leased or for services rendered, which is not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106
(1995). Old Article 9 recognizes that the distinction between asset sales and
assets transferred as collateral was often blurred in practice, and as such, a
distinction between the two was not made in the statute for purposes of the
notice requirement. Id. § 9-102(1)(b).
36. See Stephen L. Sepinuck, Classifying Credit Card Receivables Under the
U C.C.: Playing with Instruments?, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 789 (1990).
37. See generally id.
38. Chattel paper is defined as "a writing or writings which evidence both a
monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods."
U.C.C. § 9-105 (1)(b) (1995).
39. Securitization of general intangibles and instruments relegated
transferees to non-Article 9 law (namely, state common law or remnants of pre-
U.C.C. accounts receivable statutes) to determine their rights and
responsibilities. (Notably, if proper non-Article 9 steps to perfect under the
properly applicable non-Article 9 law, if any, are taken, the transferor's trustee in
bankruptcy will not be able to defeat the transferee's interest. Discovery of and
compliance with the appropriate governing law, however, may not be a simple
matter. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000) (describing scope of the trustee in bankruptcy's
powers)). See Jeffrey E. Bjork, Seeking Predictability in Bankruptcy: An
Alternative to Judicial Recharacterization in Structured Financing, 14 BANKR.
DEV. J. 119, 122 (1997) (pointing out that "[a] lack of certainty with respect to
how the transaction may be characterized will almost assuredly reduce, if not
destroy, the market for such securities").
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transfer has been a further concern of parties to securitization
transactions.' Courts decide whether a particular transfer is a
collateral transfer or a true sale based upon the presence or
absence of a number of factors." These factors include: (i) residual
interests retained by the transferor, (ii) transfer price set at fair
market value by independent appraisers, (iii) recourse to the asset
transferor, (iv) the acquisition of dominion and control over the
assets by the transferee, (v) the transfer of the benefits and
burdens of ownership by the transferee, and (vi) the intent of the
parties as expressed in their writings.'2 Many securitization
transactions, however, include a mix of factors, some suggesting a
40. See Bjork, supra note 39, at 122 (noting that "[tlhe potential problems
associated with securitization in the bankruptcy context are properly attributable
to inconsistent judicial evaluation of these transactions").
41. See generally Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhof, Characterization
of a Transfer of Receivables as a Sale or Secured Loan Upon the Bankruptcy of
the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 186-206 (1991) (noting that bankruptcy
courts look at the context of the asset transfer, taking into consideration a variety
of factors).
42. See, e.g., In re Comet Capital Corp., 142 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(explaining that a transfer was a loan due to transferee's payment of interest to
purchasers of interests, notwithstanding transferor's default); In re Evergreen
Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Maine 1982) (explaining that a
transfer was a security interest due to debtor's retained interest); In re Hurricane
Elkhorn Coal Corp., 19 B.R. 609 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (explaining that a
transfer was a security interest because of debtor's retained interest); Federated
Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 500, 511 (1968), affd, 426 F.2d 417 (6th Cir.
1970) (explaining that because transferor retained some risk, transfer was
deemed to be a loan); see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re
Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 272 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a transferor
retention of risk, coupled with lending interest rate, suggested a loan rather than
a sale); Bear v. Coben (In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc.), 829 F.2d 705, 707, 710
(9th Cir. 1986). See generally Aicher & Fellerhof, supra note 41, at 182-84; Peter
L. Mancini, Bankruptcy and the UC.C. as Applied to Securitization:
Characterizing a Mortgage Loan Transfer as a Sale or Secured Loan, 73 B.U. L.
REv. 873, 877-82 (1992) (noting that the U.C.C. provides no rules for resolving
the sale/loan issue); Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of
Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 287, 290 (1991) (relating the absence of
universal criteria for the determination of the sale versus loan issue); see also
Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 542-44 (3d Cir.
1979) (describing the factors relevant to the determination of the existence of a
true sale).
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true sale and others suggesting a collateral transfer. While parties
may intend one characterization, the facts and circumstances of the
transfer may suggest another.' Because definitively concluding a
particular asset transfer is a true sale is so difficult, lawyers have
historically been reluctant, and in some instances unwilling, to offer
unqualified legal opinions to that effect.4'
Even if the parties' characterization of both the assets
43. See, e.g., Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc. (In re
S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279, 283 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (determining,
notwithstanding the parties' characterization as a sale, that a participation
agreement was determined to be a loan transaction); Boerner v. Colwell Co., 577
P.2d 200, 204-05 (Cal. 1978) (deeming a transfer of construction contracts to be a
sale and not a loan).
44. See, e.g., George Bermant, The Role of the Opinion of Counsel: A
Tentative Reevaluation, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 132 (1974); Scott Fitzgibbon & Donald
W. Glazer, Legal Opinions in Corporate Transaction: The Opinion on
Agreements and Instruments, 12 J. CORP. COUNS. 657 (1987); Robert J. Harter, Jr.
& Kenneth N. Klee, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy Code on the "Bankruptcy
Out" in Legal Opinions, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 277 (1979); Special Committee on
Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, New York City County Lawyer's
Ass'n in Cooperation with The Corporation Law Committee of the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York & The Corporation Law Committee of the Banking,
Corporation and Business Section, New York State Bar Ass'n, Legal Opinions to
Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 Bus. LAW. 1891 (1979); see also United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and
The Courts: Hearings Regarding the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 106th Cong., Mar.
18, 1999 (statement of Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-gros.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002)
[hereinafter Grosshandler Statement].
In order to obtain sales treatment under the relevant accounting standards,
participants in mortgage-backed and asset-backed securitization transactions
must obtain assurances from counsel that the sale of assets will be final under
applicable bankruptcy law. Such legal advice is referred to as a "true sale
opinion." Unfortunately, there is a lack of guiding judicial precedent regarding
what constitutes such a true sale of assets. The considerations in the analysis
are highly subjective and depend upon a qualitative assessment of a wide
variety of facts and circumstances. For these and other reasons, any true sale
opinion will generally be a reasoned one, with various assumptions as to factual
matters and conclusions that introduce an unnecessary degree of legal
uncertainty in the asset-backed market. As a result, for some types of
transactions, true sale opinions can be extremely difficult, costly, and in a few
cases, impossible to render.
Id. at 10.
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transferred and the nature of the transfer is deemed by a court to
be correct, the transferor's bankruptcy may still pose a threat to
the interests of the transferee. While it is commonly understood
that the sale of an asset, if perfected, removes it from the
transferor's bankruptcy estate, this understanding is not universal.'5
In the now notorious ' case of Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer,47
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
property sold by the debtor prior to its bankruptcy was part of
debtor's bankruptcy estate.4 The Tenth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of "estate" in United
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,9 in concluding that because property
of the estate includes property subject to a security interest, and
because the sales of accounts are governed by the law governing
45. Recently, the bankruptcy court in In re LTV Steel., Inc., held that Debtor
retained "at least some equitable interest" in its securitized receivables,
"sufficient to support the entry of the interim cash collateral order." In re LTV
Steel, Inc., No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 5,
2001).
46. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Octagon Gas Ruling Creates Turmoil for
Commercial and Asset-Based Finance, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1993, at 1 (sharply
criticizing the Octagon decision).
47. Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995
F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993). In Octagon, the transferee did not file a financing
statement to perfect its interest, leaving it vulnerable to avoidance by the
bankruptcy trustee, pursuant to its § 544(a) lien avoidance powers. Id. It is
possible, however, that the transferee was automatically perfected under § 9-
302(1)(e), providing for the automatic perfection of certain isolated and small
transfers of accounts. Id. at 958.
48 Octagon did not present the issue of what is included in a transferor's
bankruptcy estate in the context of a prototypical securitization. Instead, the
transferor was transferring interests in the proceeds of certain sales of natural
gas. Id. at 951, 954. The Court initially observed that the transferred interest was
an account, as defined by Section 9-106, and sales of accounts are governed by
Article 9. Id. The Court continued by observing that, notwithstanding the fact
that the "transactions giving rise to the account were not intended to secure a
debt," asset sales are covered by Article 9, "whether intended for security or
not." Id. at 955. The underlying asset, natural gas, once extracted and sold, is a
"good," and the payment stream arising from the sale of that good is an
"account." Id. Article 9 defines an "account" as "any right to payment for goods
sold.., which is not evidenced by an instrument of chattel paper." OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12A § 9-106 (West Supp. 1993).
49. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203-05 (1983).
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transfers of security interests, accounts sold remain property of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate.-"
Indeed, the Octagon decision, coupled with the uncertainty
surrounding both the issue of asset classification and the scope of
Article 9, led the PEB Drafting Committee to make a series of
substantive changes to Article 9, designed to minimize the risk to
originators and investors engaging in securitization transactions."
III. REVISED ARTICLE 9'S CHANGES IMPACTING SECURITIZING
ORIGINATORS AND THEIR CREDITORS
A. Issues of Asset Classification and Article 9's Governance of Sale
Revised Article 9 makes it easier to securitize a greater
number of types of assets.52 Revised Section 9-102(a)(2) has
redefined "account" to include "right[s] to payment of a monetary
obligation.., for property that has been or is to be sold, leased,
licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of." 3 Many categories of
"rights to payment," that were formerly classified as general
intangibles or instruments under old Article 9,' now fall within
Revised Article 9's definition of "accounts."" Now, intellectual
property licensing receivables as well as credit card receivables are
explicitly classified as accounts and may be sold - and thus
securitized - under Article 9. This change in the definition of
"account" addresses the securitization market's concerns about
ambiguity both in asset classification and in the applicable law
governing transfer.
Moreover, Article 9's sales coverage is further expanded to
50. Octagon, 995 F.2d at 957.
51. PEB STUDY, supra note 6, at 181-84.
52. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
53. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001).
54. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972) (amended 1999).
55. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2000). Now, intellectual licensing receivables as
well as credit card receivables are explicitly classified as accounts and may be sold
- and thus securitized - under Article 9. See id.; see also THOMAS M. WARD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 2:11 (2000).
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include "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes."56
"Payment intangibles," a new category of collateral, are defined as
"general intangible[s] under which the account debtor's principal
obligation is a monetary obligation."" Receivables that are not
"chattel paper," "instruments" or "accounts"58 (because they are
not "property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed,
assigned or otherwise disposed of") are "general intangibles" for
the payment of money - meaning, "payment intangibles."59 The
56. Revised § 9-109(a)(3) states that "this article applies to .. .a sale of
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes." U.C.C. § 9-
109(a)(3) (2001). The definition of "promissory note" is similarly new, and
according to the Official Comment, was "necessitated by the inclusion of sales of
promissory notes within the scope of Article 9." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(65). The
definition reads:
'Promissory note' means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a
monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain
an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of
money or funds.
Id.
57. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61). Comment 5d notes that "payment intangibles"
are a subset of "general intangibles." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) cmt. 5d. "Virtually
any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment of money once one
hypothesizes, for example, that the account debtor is in breach of its obligation."
Id. The term "payment intangible," however, embraces only those general
intangibles "under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary
obligation." Id. (emphasis in original). General intangibles are a "residual
category of personal property" under Revised Article 9. Comment 5d to Revised
§ 9-102(42) states that "any personal property, including things in action, other
than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts,
documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights,
letters of credit, money, and oil, gas or other minerals before extraction" are
general intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42). Examples cited in the Official
Comment include intellectual property and the right to payment of a loan of
funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument. U.C.C. § 9-
102(a)(42) cmt. 5d.
58. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2).
59. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) ("'General intangible' means any personal
property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper,
commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments,
investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas,
or other minerals before extraction."). "'Payment intangible' means a general
intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary
obligation." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61).
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definition of "payment intangibles" includes payment streams from
the sale of portions of loan pools, known as loan participations.'
B. Removal of Restrictions on the Transfer of Certain Assets
UCC Section 9-406(d) & (f), building upon old Section 9-
318(4)," renders ineffective both contractual anti-assignment
provisions and any "rule of law, statute, or regulation" that
restricts assignment of payment rights.6' These provisions make
explicit that they (i) apply to assignments and transfers as well as
security interests, (ii) render ineffective terms that merely restrict,
rather than prohibit assignment, and (iii) render ineffective terms
that trigger a default, termination or other penalty based on
assignment.' Moreover, revised Section 9-408 makes many
60. Transfers of interests of loan participations are perfected automatically.
U.C.C. § 9-309(3) ("The following security interests are perfected when they
attach:... (3) a sale of a payment intangible."). The danger with such automatic
perfection of a transfer of payment intangibles and promissory notes is that
searchers of the public records will not discover another party's prior interest in
these assets.
61. Former U.C.C. § 9-318(4) reads:
A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective
if it prohibits assignment of an account or prohibits creation of a security
interest in a general intangible for money due or to become due or requires the
account debtor's consent to such assignment or security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-318 (1995).
62. U.C.C. §§ 9-406(d) & (f) (2001).
63. See id. Specifically, new U.C.C. § 9-406(d) reads:
d) [Term restricting assignment generally ineffective.] Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (e) and Sections 2A-303 and 9-407, and subject to
subsection (h), a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an
assignor or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it:
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person
obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation,
attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account,
chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or
(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment,
perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default,
breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination,
or remedy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory
note.
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otherwise non-assignable rights lienable, provided that the rights of
the account debtor ' are not adversely affected.65 These Article 9
revisions are designed to aid the securitization of assets by
removing or reducing restrictions on such assets' transfer while
protecting account debtors' interests."
C. Debtors Retain No Interest in Sold Assets
The issue that was clouded by the Octagon decision67 -
whether a debtor retains an interest in sold assets - is squarely
addressed in UCC's Revised Section 9-318(a). 68 This section states
that "[a] debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment
intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable
interest in the collateral sold.
69
Revised Section 9-318(b) further makes explicit that "a debtor
U.C.C. § 9-406(d).
64. Comment 5 to Revised § 9-408 further makes clear that the term
"account debtor," defined in Revised § 9-102 (3), refers to:
the party, other than the debtor, to a general intangible, including a permit,
license, franchise, or the like, and the person obligated on a health-care-
insurance receivable, which is a type of account. The definition of 'account
debtor' does not limit the term to persons who are obligated to pay under a
general intangible. Rather, the term includes all persons who are obligated on a
general intangible, including those who are obligated to render performance in
exchange for payment.
U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 5 (emphasis in original). The licensor of intellectual property
is obligated to perform on "general intangibles" and is therefore an "account
debtor." See WARD, supra note 55, at § 2:13.
65. U.C.C. §§ 9-408(a) & (c). Consent of the account debtor, however, is
required to enforce such security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-408(d).
66. Thus, "'[a]ccount debtor' means a person obligated on an account, chattel
paper, or general intangible. The term does not include persons obligated to pay
a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper."
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3).
67. See supra, notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
68. U.C.C. § 9-318(a).
69. See id. Comment 2 observes that this provision:
makes explicit what was implicit, but perfectly obvious, under former Article 9:
The fact that an account or chattel paper gives rise to a "security interest" does
not imply that the seller retains an interest in the property that has been sold.
To the contrary, a seller of an account or chattel paper retains no interest
whatsoever in the property to the extent it has been sold.
U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 2.
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that has sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer's security
interest is unperfected,... [has] rights and title to the account or
chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold."7 Comment 3 to
the section observes: "if the buyer's security interest is unperfected,
the seller can transfer, and the creditors of the seller can reach, the
account or chattel paper as if it had not been sold."'" Accordingly,
upon the transferor's bankruptcy, the trustee can recover the
unperfected transfer under Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a), and
such transferred assets are included in the bankruptcy estate.72
Section 9-318, however, does not address the equitable
determination of whether a particular asset transfer is properly
characterized as a sale of assets or a transfer of collateral in
connection with a loan (the collateral transfer versus true sale
dilemma).73 Comment 2 makes this clear in noting that, "[n]either
this Article nor the definition of 'security interest' in Section 1-201
provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that
create a security interest securing an obligation."7 ' Thus, this
remains a determination to be made by courts on a case-by-case
basis.
D. Express Validation of After-Acquired Receivables to Be
Securitized
Revised Sections 9-204(a) & (c) expressly validates "after-
acquired property" and "future advance" clauses when the
transaction involves the sale of "accounts," "chattel paper,"
"payment intangibles" and "promissory notes."75 The comment to
70. Id. § 9-318(b).
71. Id. § 9-318 cmt. 3.
72 Id. §§ 541(a)(3), 544 (Section 544(a) provides that "[tihe trustee ... may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor.., that is voidable by ... a bona fide
purchaser. .. against whom applicable law permits such a transfer to be perfected
73. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (describing the proposed
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code designed to federalize the true sale versus
collateral transfer determination, based upon the parties to the transaction's
characterization of the transfer).
74. U.C.C § 9-318 cmt. 2.
75. Revised Section 9-204 (a) & (c) read:
(a) a security agreement may create or provide for a security interest in after-
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the section observes that these provisions make explicit what was
implicit under old Article 9.76 While not changing the law, this
revision will increase ABS investors' confidence that their initially
perfected interests in asset-backed securities, backed by after-
acquired payment streams, will remain perfected.'
E. Exoanded Concept of "Proceeds"
The definition of collateral "proceeds" has been modified
under Revised Article 9.7" Revised Section 9-102(a)(64) defines
"proceeds" as "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other disposition of collateral," and "rights arising out
of collateral."" This definition, in eliminating the requirement that
to constitute proceeds, the original collateral must be "disposed"
of, expands the type of collateral that may be claimed by a
perfected transferee of securitized assets. The impact of this
expanded definition is most fully realized upon the securitization of
originator's bankruptcy.'
acquired collateral ...
(c) [a] security agreement may provide that collateral secures, or that accounts,
chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes are sold in connection
with, future advances or other value, whether or not the advances or value or
given pursuant to commitment.
Id. at §§ 9-204(a) & (c).
76. Id. §§ 9-204(a) & (c) cmt. 6. But see Carlson, supra note 9, at 1111-12
("Article 9 does not expressly authorize after acquired property clauses when
accounts are sold. Rather, it authorizes after-acquired property clauses only
when a lender advances a loan and takes after-acquired accounts as collateral.").
77. PEB Study, supra note 6, at 185.
78. Old Article 9 defines "proceeds" as what is "received upon the sale,
exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-
306(1) (1995).
79. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2001). "Proceeds" now specifically includes "cash
or stock dividends distributed on account of securities or other investment
property that is original collateral," rejecting the holding of Hastie. See Hastie v.
FDIC, 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993). U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 13a.
80. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 309 (discussing the significance of the
expanded definition of "proceeds" of collateral in terms of the securitization
originator's bankruptcy).
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Bankruptcy law makes a clear distinction between proceeds of
collateral and property that arises after the initial secured
transaction that does not fall within the definition of "proceeds,"
namely "after-acquired collateral."'" Assets that are acquired by a
bankruptcy debtor following the filing of a petition are either
deemed to be "proceeds" or "after acquired property."82 Section
552 of the Bankruptcy Code cuts off secured parties' interests in
"after acquired collateral," unless the post-petition collateral is
proceeds of the original collateral. Section 552, in limiting its
recognition of post-petition security interests, furthers the
bankruptcy policy of preserving the value of the bankruptcy estate
for the benefit of the bankruptcy debtor's unsecured creditors.'
81. See id. at 306, 309 (detailing how Article 9 distinguishes between
"proceeds" of collateral and "after-acquired collateral"). After-acquired
collateral is "[t]hat property that arises after the initial secured transaction that
does not fall within the definition of 'proceeds'." Id. at 309 (emphasis in original).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
83. Section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that "[e]xcept as provided
in subsection (b), property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the
commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security
agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case." 11
U.S.C. § 552(a). Section 552(b) states:
(b)(1) if the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the
commencement of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring, or profits of
such property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds, product,
offspring, or profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case
to the extent provided in such security agreement and by applicable
nonbankruptcy law, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a
hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.
11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
84. "The scope of... [§ 541(a)(1)] is broad. It includes all kinds of property,
including tangible or intangible property causes of action ... and all other forms
of property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act." H.R. Rep.
No. 95-595, p. 367 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 82 (1978). Numerous
bankruptcy precedents confirm the debtor's need for post-petition cash flow in
order to reorganize and pay unsecured creditors. See In re Dynaco Corp., 162
B.R. 389, 393 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) ("Debtors seeking to reorganize under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code frequently need to use their cash and
proceeds therefrom in order to continue with their business operations."); see
also In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (recognizing the
necessity of debtor's using cash collateral rents in the first months following a
3392002]
340 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
Because the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define
"proceeds," the Article 9 definition of "proceeds" becomes key to
the determination of what estate property remains
unencumbered.'5 Because ABS purchasers can reach proceeds, but
not after acquired property, the expanded definition of "proceeds"
in Revised Article 9 will result in less unencumbered "after-
acquired property" and a greater number and type of assets
deemed to be the "proceeds" of asset-backed security-holder's
interests."
bankruptcy in order to conduct its business during the reorganization effort); In
re Earth Lite, Inc., 9 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) ("[I]t is evident that if
a Debtor who seeks relief under Chapter 11 is deprived of the use of cash, its
chances to secure rehabilitation are immediately destroyed and very few, if any,
entities could survive and effectuate a reorganization without cash."); In re
Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 B.R. 720, 721 (W.D. Mo. 1982) ("The evidence
shows that debtor could not reorganize without the use of cash collateral."); see
also United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and The Courts: Hearings Regarding the Business
Bankruptcy Act, 106th Cong. (Mar. 17, 1999) (testimony of Professor Kenneth N.
Klee, on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference), available at
http://www.house.gov/judciary/106-klee.htm (last visited on Feb. 20, 2002)
[hereinafter Klee Testimony].
85. Courts have not been consistent in their interpretation of what is meant
by "proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" in Section 552(b). See In re Hastie, 2
F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) The exception "except to any extent that the court...
based on the equities of other case, orders otherwise" has only added to the
inconsistency of court opinions with respect to this issue. See id. (relying upon
state law definition of proceeds in holding that a security interest in stock
dividends was not perfected because it was not a substitute for disposed of stock
(the collateral), pursuant to section 9-306(4)); In re Bumper Sales, 907 F.2d 1430,
1437 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that Article 9's definition of "proceeds" was the
definition to be applied in determining the scope of Bankruptcy Code § 552(b));
J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 779 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a party with a security interest in receivables and accounts had a
perfected interest, as proceeds, in a payment received post-petition pursuant to a
pre-petition account). Revised Article 9 brings licensing income within the
definition of "proceeds" whether or not any portion of the underlying intellectual
property was "disposed of" under the license. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2001);
WARD, supra note 55, §§ 2:29, 2:86-91.
86. See WARD, supra note 55, at § 2 (explaining that Revised Article 9's
expansion of the definition of proceeds has resulted in a substantial benefit to
leveraged secured creditors).
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AFFECTING
SECURITIZATION
Among the many proposed changes in the pending bankruptcy
reform legislation is a redefinition of the term "estate."" The
proposed amendment to Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code
excludes from the debtor's "estate" assets transferred in a
securitization transaction."
87. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code reads in part:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
88. Section 912 of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001 (Introduced in the House on Jan. 30, 2001) reads:
SEC. 912. ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATIONS.
Section 541 of title 11, United States Code, is amended
(i) in subsection (b) by inserting after paragraph (7), as added by this Act, the
following:
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset
was transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to
an eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed securitization, except to
the extent such assets (or proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the
trustee under section 550 by virtue of avoidance under section 548(a); and
(ii) by adding at the end the following new subsection
(f) For purposes of this section -
(1) The term 'asset-backed securitization' means a transaction in which eligible
assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of payment on
securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by governmental
units, at least one class or tranche of which was rated investment grade by one
or more nationally recognized securities rating organizations, when the
securities were initially issued by an issuer;
(2) The term 'eligible asset' means-
(A) financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds thereof), either
fixed or revolving, whether or not the same are in existence as of the date of the
transfer, including residential and commercial mortgage loans, consumer
receivables, trade receivables, assets of governmental units, including payment
obligations relating to taxes, receipts, fines, tickets, and other sources of
revenue, and lease receivables, that, by their terms, convert into cash within a
finite period, plus any residual interest in property subject to receivables
included in such financing assets plus any rights or other assets designed to
assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to security holders;
(B) cash; and
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The redefinition of "estate" will remove from the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court, "eligible assets" "transferred" by the
debtor to an "eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed
securitization." 89  "Eligible assets" are defined to include
commonly securitized receivables.' Receivables, including credit
(C) securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by
governmental units;
The term 'eligible entity' means-
(A) an issuer; or
(B) a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit. Limited liability
company (including a single member limited liability company), or other entity
engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and transferring eligible assets
directly or indirectly to an issuer and taking actions ancillary thereto;
The term 'issuer' means a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit,
limited liability company (including a single member limited liability company),
or other entity engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and holding
eligible assets, issuing securities backed by eligible assets, and taking actions
ancillary thereto; and
The term 'transferred' means, the debtor, under a written agreement,
represented and warranted that eligible assets were sold, contributed, or
otherwise conveyed with the intention of removing them from the estate of the
debtor pursuant to subsection (b)(8) (whether or not reference is made to this
title or any section hereof), irrespective and without limitation of -
(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an interest in the
issuer or in any securities issued by the issuer;
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to service or
supervise the servicing of all or any portion of such eligible assets; or
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other conveyance for tax,
accounting, regulatory reporting or other purposes.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333,
107th Cong. § 912.
89. Id.; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). Before and currently, no such asset would
escape a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction unless it was definitively sold away to the
debtor prior to bankruptcy. See Carlson, supra note 9, at 1056 (arguing against
the very result that Revised Section 912 would institutionalize).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Furthermore, the definition of "asset securitization"
in the amendment does not exclude all securitized assets form the originator's
bankruptcy estate - simply those assets that are transferred and result in the
issuance of securities rated investment grade or better by a nationally-recognized
statistical rating organization. This limits the "carve out" from the definition of
"estate" to public offering and rated private issuances. Unrated assets securitized
in private issuances remain uncovered by this exception, however. See also
Testimony of Ann Stern, CEO, Financial Guarantee Insurance Corporation,
FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TESTIMONY, May 19, 1998
[hereinafter Stem Testimony] (claiming that the application of the proposed
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card receivables, intellectual property licenses, cash and securities
are all deemed to be "eligible" for purposes of this provision."
V. NORMATIVE ISSUES RAISED BY CHANGES TO ARTICLE 9 AND
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE - THE SYSTEM
HAS BEEN SHOCKED!
The debate among legal scholars concerning whether secured
creditors ought to have full priority in bankruptcy continued
throughout Article 9's revision process.' Some academics posited
that it is economically efficient and socially desirable for secured
claims in bankruptcy to have full priority of repayment.93 Other
scholars, citing efficiency and fairness concerns, challenged the
absolute supremacy of secured claims, to the exclusion of
unsecured claims and questioned whether secured financing's
continued dominance misallocates resources by forcing unsecured
creditors into the role of recipient of limited residual interests,
without their affirmative consent. ' The issues raised in this debate
have spilled over and have application to the question of whether
amendment is limited to "investment grade securities substantially reduc[ing] the
possibility that a lender or an operating company could transfer some or all of its
loan assets or other receivables to a bankruptcy remote entity in an effort to
defraud creditors of the company.").
91. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001,
H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001); WARD, supra note 55, § 2:11.
92 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. For a brief synopsis of the
debate, see ABI Releases Law Review on Revised Article 9, BCD NEWS &
COMMENT, Aug. 1, 2001.
93. See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured
Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 KAN. L. REv. 13
(1993); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and
Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Hideki Kanda & Saul
Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REv. 2103 (1994); Homer
Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial
Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 929 (1985); Alan Schwarz, The
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984); Robert E.
Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1986);
Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1067, 1118 (1989); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal
Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1984).
94. See sources cited supra note 8.
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there are any harmful consequences to the unsecured creditors of
securitizing debtors in bankruptcy and whether securitized asset
transferees ought to be able to opt out, by contract, of participation
in the bankruptcy process."
The most immediate and obvious effect of the Revised Article
9 provisions that streamline, facilitate and generally make
securitization easier to effectuate will be a further expansion of the
securitization market.96 The revised definition of "account" ' and
the extension of Article 9's sales coverage,98 coupled with the
relaxation of restrictions on asset transfers," will make it easier to
securitize more types of assets with greater certainty."M Moreover,
if bankruptcy courts adopt Revised Article 9's definition of
proceeds, more post-petition assets will be deemed to be
securitized proceeds, rather than after-acquired unencumbered
estate property. Accordingly, a consequence of this expansion will
be that fewer assets available for residual claimants upon a
securitizing originator's liquidation.
A less obvious, although not necessarily less immediate, effect
of Article 9 changes will be that securitizing businesses, having
transferred their cash flow will have less ability to, and thus will be
less likely to, reorganize. ' Since a debtor's bankruptcy estate does
not generally include property transferred, the more after-acquired
proceeds are deemed to have been securitized, the more assets that
are outside of the reach of the automatic stay and the trustee's
turnover powers. As such, a securitizing debtor-in-bankruptcy's
cash flow from its securitized receivables will be unavailable to the
95. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
96. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 293 (pointing out that "the volume of ABS
issuances has grown from $1 billion in 1985 to $185 billion in 1999").
97. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001).
9& Id. § 9-102(a)(2) cmt. 5a.
99. Id. §§ 9-406(d) & (f).
100. See, e.g., Edward E. Gainor, Pending Legislation Would Change True
Sale Analysis, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Mar. 12, 2001 (stating that "[the]
proposed legislative provisions should have the effect of simplifying some
securitization structures and facilitating transactions that are difficult or
impossible to execute under the constraints imposed by traditional true sale
analysis;" see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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debtor for use in connection with its reorganization efforts. '1 This
cash flow may be necessary to pay employees, trade creditors,
consumer claims, and to generally keep the debtor afloat during
the pending reorganization. 3
The Article 9 revisions will have an even greater effect on
bankruptcy outcomes when read in conjunction with proposed
changes in the Bankruptcy Code designed to further benefit parties
to securitization transactions." The bankruptcy reform legislation
102. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 294-97, 301-02 (noting, however, that the
opposite result is also possible, as evidenced by the Octagon Gas Systems v.
Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948, 957 decision). In the recent case of In re LTV Steel, Inc.,
the Bankruptcy Court examined the issue of whether a reorganizing debtor
retained any interest in its securitized receivables. See generally In re LTV Steel,
Inc., No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2001). In
that case the Court observed that if debtor was unable to access its liquid
receivables, it would have immediately ceased business operations. LTV Steel,
Inc., 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 at *5. With respect to the issue of whether the
securitized assets were property of the estate, the court said:
[Tihere seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest that the Debtor does not
retain at least an equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim
order. Debtor's business requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast various
metal products. To suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in
products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds to be derived
from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly, the court concludes that
Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the inventory and receivables,
and that this interest is property of the Debtor's estate. This equitable interest
is sufficient to support the entry of the interim cash collateral order. Finally, it
is readily apparent that granting Abbey National relief from the interim cash
collateral order would be highly inequitable. The Court is satisfied that the
entry of the interim order was necessary to enable Debtor to keep its doors
open and continue to meet its obligations to its employees, retirees, customers
and creditors. Allowing Abbey National to modify the order would allow
Abbey National to enforce its state law rights as a secured lender to look to the
collateral in satisfaction of this debt. This circumstance would put an end to
Debtor's business, would put thousands of people out of work, would deprive
100,000 retirees of needed medical benefits, and would have more far reaching
economic effects on the geographic areas where Debtor does business ....
Id. at 131.
103. Id. In addition, refer to cases listed supra note 84, evidencing the courts'
recognition that the debtor must have access to a healthy cash flow in order to
successfully meet the goals of bankruptcy. See also Klee Testimony, supra note
84.
104. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text; see also Klee Testimony,
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includes a redefinition of the term "estate,""0 ° carving out of it
certain assets that have been transferred in connection with a
securitization. Notwithstanding the fact that it was referred to in
the Congressional Record as a "clarification,"'" and Congressional
testimony as "in the nature of [a] technical correction,"" this
provision, if enacted, will fundamentally alter the essence of
supra note 85 (explaining how the new changes will be a detriment both to
debtors' estates and to unsecured creditors).
105. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, n.173 (noting that a debtor's bankruptcy
estate was originally defined under § 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Act as comprising
of "interests of the debtor in property."); see also 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (2000)
(stating that a trustee has the power to "collect and reduce to money the property
of the estate"); Id. § 726 (outlining the scheme for the distribution of property of
the estate); Id. § 1129 (describing how property of the estate used in connection
with plan of reorganization); Id. §§ 363(b)(1), (c)(1) (noting that the property of
the estate must be used, sold or leased); Id. §§ 364(c)(2), (c)(3), (d)(1) (debtor's
borrowing secured by property of the estate); Id. § 542(a) (authorizing the trustee
to demand return of "property that the trustee may use, sell or lease under
section 363); Id. §§ 362(a)(2) - (4); Id. § 364(d). Of course, a secured party whose
collateral is being used by a reorganizing debtor must be offered "adequate
protection" of its interest. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions
and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 298-99 (pointing out that adequate
protection is usually the only consideration given to such a secured party). In
addition, the Code's automatic stay precludes actions taken with respect to
property of the estate. In Chapter 11 cases, property of the estate necessary to
the reorganization may be used by the debtor, notwithstanding a secured parties'
state law created interest. The corollary to this rule, designed to encourage the
reorganization of viable businesses, is that debtor may not use non-estate
property to reorganize.
106. Congressional Record, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001, 107th Cong., Jan. 31, 2001, available at
http://www.abiworld.org/hr333.html (last visited on Feb. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation] (noting that
"the purpose of the special order to which I am attached today is to announce the
introduction of the new bankruptcy reform act that we hope will be enacted into
law during this current session and swiftly to arrive at the President's desk for
signature.... It also clarifies the treatment of certain financial contracts under
the banking laws as well as under the Bankruptcy Code").
107. Grosshandler Statement, supra note 44 ("These proposed changes should
not raise sweeping new policy issues - they are entirely consistent with many
statutory provision that have already been enacted, and are in the nature of
technical corrections.").
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business bankruptcy."
Property that constitutes a debtor's bankruptcy estate is at the
center of the bankruptcy process." Estate property is used to
satisfy creditor claims, it may be used, sold, leased, or borrowed
against, and it may be required to be returned to the estate if the
property is currently in the hands of third parties. '  As noted
above, the Bankruptcy Code has historically relied upon non-
bankruptcy law to define the rights of parties to the bankruptcy
under the Code."' Ascertaining whether a transfer of Article 9
assets are properly included in the transferee's bankruptcy estate,
the nature of the transfer, as well as the steps needed to establish
the transferee's property rights have always been non-bankruptcy-
law determinations.
Current law tries to balance the rights of transferees of
securitized assets against the interests of the debtor's general
creditors,... who may not be aware, unless they check the public
filing records, that the debtor no longer owns what appears to be
its income stream. At present, in order for an asset transferee to
108. This section would allow many transactions to be structured so that in the
event of bankruptcy, no cash collateral would be available for funding a
reorganization or repaying unsecured creditors. This is because of the overly broad
definition which treats many secured loans as asset transfer, which in turn would
remove those assets from property of the bankrupt's estate. Removal of such assets
will virtually ensure a shortage of cash, and thereby create a crisis for many troubled
businesses whose receivables represent the only source of liquidity. Because this
provision represents a departure from the federal policy of favoring reorganizations
over the liquidation of viable business enterprises, the League opposes this provision.
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and The Courts: Hearings Regarding the Business Bankruptcy Act,
106th Congress (Mar. 19, 1999) (Statement of the Commercial Law League of
America and its Bankruptcy and Insolvency Section), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-gree.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
109. The debtor's estate, as defined under section 541(a), is comprised of
"interests of the debtor in property." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1997).
110. Id. § 704(1) (stating that trustee has the power to "collect and reduce to
money the property of the estate").
111. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
112. Worcester County Nat'l Bank v. Xinde Int'l, Inc., 13 B.R. 212, 215
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) ("The court in a reorganization case must balance the
needs of the creditor's protection against the debtor's likelihood of a successful
rehabilitation.").
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effectively acquire the debtor's equity in these assets, and thus
remove them from the reach of general creditors, the transfer of
accounts must be deemed a "true sale." Whether or not the
transfer is a true sale, if the asset is governed by Article 9, the
transferee must give notice of the transfer by filing a financing
statement."3 As stated earlier, because a bulk "true sale" of a
debtor's accounts can be structured in a way that takes on certain
aspects of a secured loan to the debtor,"' state law allows the
debtor's creditors to pierce the formal structure of a documented
"sale" of accounts and treat the buyer's interest as a lien rather
than an ownership right."5
Section 912 of the bankruptcy reform legislation upsets the
current balance and unduly favors the institutional investors at the
expense of ordinary general creditors of the debtor, and the debtor
itself, who will not be able to reorganize in bankruptcy without any
access to cash flow."6 Two parts of Section 912 are particularly
one-sided attempts to give federal protection to participants in the
structured finance market.
First, the proposed amendment both "federalizes" and
"formalizes" the issue of whether the underlying transfer of these
account assets is a sale (as distinguished from a collateral transfer
made in connection with a loan). Under the proposed language of
Section 912, whenever the parties represent in writing that a sale
was intended, that formal characterization controls,
notwithstanding the way the transfer would be characterized under
state law."7 The decided cases contain instances where transfers
framed as "sales" by parties are determined to be the functional
113. See generally Charles Cheatham, Changes in Filing Procedures Under
Revised Article 9, 25 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 235 (2000) (detailing the numerous
filing requirements of parties to a secured transaction governed by Article 9, with
the Article's 1999 revision in mind).
114. See Plank, supra note 42, at 290; see also supra notes 40-44 and
accompanying text.
115. See id. at 315-16.
116. See generally Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 9, at 226-31 (lamenting
the "privatization" of the bankruptcy system, and arguing that thanks to Section
912, larger institutional investors will be able to "circumvent the bankruptcy
process" through securitization).
117. For the text of the proposed Section 912, see supra note 88.
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equivalent of a collateralized loan."' For example, when the
debtor retains some risk of ownership or when the buyer retains
recourse rights against the debtor, courts, citing consideration of
fairness, have overridden the parties' formal expression of intent
and properly characterized the transaction as a collateralized
loan."9
Notwithstanding some of the testimony in hearings in support
of proposed Section 912,"z there is not "a lack of guiding judicial
precedent regarding what constitutes such a true sale of assets.' ' .
Courts analyzing the circumstances of the transfer and the interests
of all parties affected by the transaction regularly make this
characterization.1
Second, even if Congress decides that the special needs of the
bond market override the balance struck among creditor interests
under state law, the language of Section 912 goes too far in this
regard. Subsection (1) of proposed Section 912 purports to create
a single exception from the exclusion of these eligible assets from
the bankruptcy estate.1 n This exception allows the trustee to
recover transferred assets for the estate under Section 550 "by
virtue of avoidance under Section 548(a)."'' " The negative
118. See Plank, supra note 42, at 315-16 (discussing reasons why courts may
find a purported "true sale" to constitute a secured loan, rather than a sale).
119. See id. (citing one such instance of a judicially-determined loan).
120. E.g., Grosshandler Statement, supra note 44 ("Unfortunately, there is a
lack of guiding judicial precedent regarding what constitutes such a true sale of
assets .... As a result, for some types of transactions, true sale opinions can be
extremely difficult, costly, and in a few cases, impossible to render."). According
to Mr. Grosshandler and some other commentators, the new bankruptcy law's
empowerment of parties to decide for themselves whether the transaction is an
asset sale or loan will resolve the uncertainty and significantly reduce transaction
costs. Id.
121. Id. Indeed, the parties' own characterization of the transaction may
conflict with the plain facts and circumstances of the exchange. See supra note 43
and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (listing the courts' usual
criteria for determination, as well as multiple examples of court decisions that
systematically applied those factors to make the sale/loan determination).
123. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001,
H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001).
124. See Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the
Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 9, at 320 n.185.
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inference in this language seems to be that these excluded 'eligible
assets' are beyond the reach of the trustee's other powers to
recover transferred assets - specifically, those provided for in
sections of the law other than Section 548.'5
Section 548(a) avoidance is limited to giving the bankruptcy
trustee the right to recover for the estate transfers by the debtor
that are deemed to be fraudulently made within one-year of
bankruptcy filing.26 The other important avoidance powers include
Section 544(a)(1), which provides for the avoidance of unperfected
security interests,' and Section 547, which provides for the
avoidance of transfers that result in a preference for one creditor
over all other creditors as a group." In particular, Section
544(a)(1) allows the bankruptcy trustee to avoid unperfected
transfers of accounts when the creditor has not "perfected" its
transfer by a simple notice filing.'29
As noted above, even in the case of a true sale of accounts, a
judgment lien creditor would have state law priority in transferred
account assets when the "buyer" fails to file a financing
125. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a)(1) & 547(b)(5) (2000). Section 544(a)(1)
provides:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, any knowledge of the
trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of
property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable
by-
a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of
the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial
lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have
obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.
Id. at § 544(a)(1).
126. Id. § 548(a)(1) (according to this Section,
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily-
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted).
127. Id. § 544(a)(1).
12& Id. § 547(b)(5).
129. Id. § 544(a)(1).
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statement.3 ° It is not clear why that same unperfected buyer,
assuming a true sale of accounts, should be safe from a challenge in
bankruptcy. The proposed language that makes these federalized
"true sales" immune from Section 544(a)(1) avoidance is a
significant departure from bankruptcy law's historic deference to
state law.'31
VI. CONCLUSION
The issues raised by my Panel in the symposium, in many
ways, track the issues raised in discussions of whether secured
creditors ought to have full priority in bankruptcy. Unfortunately,
as is the case with respect to the full priority issue, most of the
assertions made regarding the wisdom of implemented and
proposed securitization-related changes are unproven. It is not
clear whether securitization is efficient or inefficient, nor is it
proven that changes in the law designed to facilitate securitization
will result, in the aggregate, in more credit availability. It is
similarly unclear, even if securitization leads to a greater
availability of credit, whether the result of the credit infusion will
stave off bankruptcy or simply postpone it. Nor is it apparent
whether a securitizing debtor's unsecured creditors, or unsecured
creditors in the aggregate, will be benefited or injured as a
consequence of a securitization. What is clear, however, is that
Bankruptcy Code changes and changes to Article 9133 will alter
bankruptcy outcomes in ways inconsistent with many of
bankruptcy's first principles, as well as with the bankruptcy
system's normative goals distributional fairness.
There have not been any empirical studies demonstrating that
the law ought to be changed to further facilitate and protect those
parties to securitization transactions. Further, there is little case
law addressing the legal issues raised by these changes and
proposed changes in the law. Likely due to the market's relative
130. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the historical goals
of bankruptcy legislation).
132. See Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation, supra note 106.
133. See generally supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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youth, there have not been many bankruptcies of securitizing
originators. Therefore, courts have not had the opportunity to
carefully scrutinize the structures of these transactions. As noted
in Congressional testimony concerning proposed Bankruptcy Code
revisions affecting securitization:
[The issues of] the possible harm to the bankruptcy estate and
other creditors that may result from securitized financings...
are unresolved, because there have been almost no cases
addressing the consequences of securitization in bankruptcy.
There are a handful of unreported opinions and almost no
reported opinions. We are not learning, because we are not
litigating. Usually, judicial development of an area gives us a
full sense of the issues raised by any new practice. It is the
interaction of case law and legislation that is the genius of the
American system ......4
134. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and The Courts: Hearings Regarding the Business
Bankruptcy Act, 105th Cong. (May 19, 1998) (testimony of Randal C. Picker).
Professor Picker was referring in his testimony to a Senate subcommittee on
behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference, on the proposed modification of
the definition of bankruptcy "estate" found in Section 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Id. The proposed language addition to Section 541 states that "eligible
assets" transferred by the debtor in a securitization are affirmatively deemed to
be excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Professor Picker testified:
This provision is objectionable. The current existence of a robust asset
securitization business, coupled with the existence of minimal case law in the
area, strongly suggest that special Bankruptcy Code treatment is unnecessary.
The broad definition of "transferred" is likely to cause certain financing
arrangements to be treated as sales to prevent the debtor's assets from being
considered property of the estate even through they are only pledged as
collateral. The proposed provision makes no effort to distinguish those
transactions properly characterized as "true sales" from those legitimately
subject to characterization as security interests ....
